Introduction
The principal issues dealt with in this paper are the closely related matters of what defines a public forum in the U.S. context of cable television and whose rights to freedom of expression must be considered in determining the future structure of the industry. In a country where there has never been a great deal of public ownership of and exercised access to the electronic mass media, cable television in the U.S. represents a continuation of that pattern. With Habermas (1973) the fundamental challenge to those in control of advanced capitalist societies is to make non-generalizable interests appear to be generalizable. In many ways, the shaping of cable television in the U.S. provides a textbook illustration of this notion.
Today, the impact and potential of specific technologies (such as the satellite, the computer, and fiber optics) tend to occupy the foreground of discussions about the &dquo;information age&dquo;. Either implicitly or explicitly, these debates often illustrate some variation on the trite McLuhanism &dquo;the medium is the message&dquo;. The basic assumption is that the future is a blank slate which can be inscribed on the basis of the raw potential foreseen in technological scenarios, and there is little regard for the influence of the dominant social institutions in society. A shortcoming of this perspective is its absolution of our media institutions and our media policy makers from accountability for the evolution of our media environment. Not only is it essential to understand media technology in its historical context, but a &dquo;technology&dquo; needs to be conceived both as artifact and as a form of human organization. The design of future communication systems is not simply technological development in a narrow sense, but it is also political and cultural development, carrying with it the responsibilities for fostering a healthy public sphere. The firmly entrenched power of U.S. media institutions, and the technical complexity of the technological systems on which they rely, make it difficult to conceive of radically democratizing public discourse through the mass media. This problem is reflected in part by the absence of means for democratically distributing social control over the development of emerging media systems and by the general political protection of established media institutions in their efforts to marginalize competing models of technologically mediated public expression. (Lewyn, 1991) . At 'Media,' 7 Feb. 1991, p. M29) . Advertising is the fastest growing source of miscellaneous revenues, and is seen by many as cable's &dquo;next frontier&dquo; (Walley, 1991; MacManus, 1990 (Stilson, 1987 'Media,' 7 Feb. 1991, p. M29) .
Average fees charged to subscribers have varied with each system over the years and have been influenced by government regulation. But with cable deregulation measures in 1986, it is safe to say that cable rates have increased significantly. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), basic rates have increased 61 % since deregulation (Lewyn, 1991) .
The GAO further observed that between December 1986 and October 1988, cable rates climbed twice the rate of inflation. Another study recently cited these above average increases in cable rates as one of the nonmarket prices affecting inflation (Evans, 1991) . By early 1991, the average monthly basic rate was $16 (Broadcasting Yearbook 1991, p. D-3) . Despite all the public attention to rate hikes, basic fees still are expected to increase significantly during the next year (Standard & Poor's Industry Sur-veys, 'Media, ' 7 Feb. 1991, p. M29).
In the late 80's, cable (Dempsey, 1990 (Dempsey, 1991) . The USA Network is not unusual, in that cable programming is increasingly surrounded by advertising messages. Despite early promotion touting advertising-free content, more and more cable channels rely heavily on advertising for increased revenues -including channels which could be considered only advertising, e.g. home shopping.
In 1986, almost $1 billion was received from local and national advertising revenue. By the end of the 80s, there were over 70 advertising-supported cable networks (Harris, 1991 (Sobel, 1991 (Weaver, 1991 (Colford, 1991 'Leisure, ' 4 July 1991 p. L40).
Typically, the cable's operator keeps 50% of pay revenues, while the remainder goes to the program supplier (Standard & Poor's Industry Scu-~~eys, 'Media,' 7 Feb. 1991, p. M30) . Hollywood studios sell films to pay services under long-term contracts (one year, in the case of HBO and Cinemax), for a fee plus a specific amount per household (Sherman, 1984) .
Often the fee is between $6-8 million per film, but sometimes license fees are connected to a film's box-office performance (Cieply, 1990) . The proliferation of films on pay cable is more understandable when considering that ready-made Hollywood movies still represent extremely economical programming. It also is not too surprising that pay cable channels are connected in some way to the film and television production community, despite the presumed separation between the &dquo;film,&dquo; &dquo;broadcasting&dquo; and &dquo;cable&dquo; industries. Pay cable release of major motion pictures usually follows home video release.
Since the failure of the studios' collective efforts to capture their own pay channel in the early 1980s, they have increasingly arranged exclusive deals for packages of films. The efforts to obtain exclusive contracts has endistribution.
hanced the competition between major pay services -that is, HBO/Cinemax versus Showtime/TMC. But the competition also has meant arrangements which tie the pay services to specific studios. For example, while Showtime could refuse some films under certain conditions, Paramount reserved the right to sell films to other pay services, such as STV and regional pay services. The deal was said to involve Showtime paying between $600-700 million for 75 Paramount features over the fiveyear period ('Showtime/Movie Channel,' 1984) . After similar deals with other film companies (Cannon, Atlantic, DeLaurentis, and Touchstone), Showtime was said to have committed about $1 billion for exclusive movie rights (Motavalli, 1986) .
Meanwhile, HBO countered by signing non-exclusive deals for films, thus preventing Showtime's stranglehold, but also to acquire films for lower prices (exclusive deals are more expensive than non-exclusive). Nevertheless, while HBO promoted the virtues of non-exclusivity, HBO's (Girard, 1984 ; 'Cable Report,' 1986; Banks, 1988; 'HBO & Orion Still Going Steady,' 1985) . In fact, HBO's (Mair, 1988 (Mair, 1988, p. 64 (Blustein, 1980; Guback, 1979) . Getty (majority owner of ESPN at the time) was to supply most of the capital and satellite distribution facilities, while the studios supplied the films. Though the venture was promoted as a boost for competition, especially for independent productions, the group would not sell films to any competing pay cable service for nine months after films aired on Premiere. They further agreed that the license fees which Premiere would pay for their films would be decided collectively. While such policies seemed obviously anti-competitive, some suspected that the strategy was to attack HBO and earn profits, while the Justice Department dealt with the legalities and succeeded in winning a U.S. Federal Appeals court case in which the proposal by the Premiere partners was found to be in violation of federal antitrust laws (Blustein, 1980) . In another attempt made by the studios to collectively challenge HBO's (White, 1985) . Again, the antitrust implications seemed obvious: the three majors involved received nearly 50% of revenues from theatrical rentals and nearly the same from pay-cable license fees. The newly-created pay channel would have about 30% of the pay cable market, and thus become an oligopoly with HBO, which then held 60% of the market. The partners argued that the merger would promote competition and challenge HBO's (Banks, 1988, p. 135) .
The bickering between the studios and HBO subsided, as they managed a somewhat strained relationship. HBO (Crittenden, 1986) . As an industry pundit commented: &dquo;...in spite of bickering and contradictions, Hollywood and HBO have always needed each other&dquo; (Mair, 1988 (Mair, 1988, p. 57 ('Telco's Army,' 1987) . Recently, the judge who presides over the AT&T divestiture has given in to pressure by deciding to lift the ban he imposed in 1982 which prevented local telephone companies from providing information services, pending further appeals (Bradsher, 1991 (Winer, 1990 (Huber, 1987, p (Fabrikant, 1991) . In sum, while it would be foolhardy to predict a date when viable prototypes of broadbands switches are available, given the many mediating political and economic factors which are shaping telecommunications network development, the present inter-industry efforts seem to be converging increasingly toward switched broadband networks for residential service.
The farce of localism . Despite mounting contradictory realities, cable television policy in the U.S. has always been nominally committed to localism. The idea behind various requirements placed on the electronic media to report local news and public affairs in general is that such practices will promote localism, or local identity. Working against the effort to foster and support a unique local identity through radio and television stations is the economic pressure to produce for larger markets in order to achieve economies of scale. Thus, small town radio and TV stations typically are over-shadowed by the slicker and more powerful influences of regional stations. The same issue pertains to local efforts in cable television. Locally originated cable programming, despite its folk appeal, lacks the ability to divert significant portions of audience attention away from network and national cable fare. These facts are suggestive of the problem inherent in idea often trotted out in efforts to develop new cable systems, namely, that these systems will help to strengthen the local &dquo;community.&dquo; It is difficult to see how in the absence of a sustained commitment on the part of the local populace and on the part of local community leaders, the local cable company will function as more than simply a node on an expansive circuit of national and transnational program distribution. As Raymond Williams (1979; 1983) ('Cities Want Changes,' 1989 (Brenner, 1988) . Unlike the situation which exists in broadcasting, local cable regulators typically allow only one cable system to a market. This situation warrants close scrutiny by those who wish to see greater competition and diversity in local cable programming. As one observer has noted, &dquo;To use an analogy, it is as if one company would own the entire television spectrum in a geographic region, and could alone determine its use&dquo; (Noam, 1982, p. 209 ).
Responses by the broadcasting industry to the idea of telephone-cable cross-ownership have been mixed. A primary concern among local broadcast stations is that they not be sidestepped in the development of a new local broadband infrastructure. The president of the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) wishes to insure that telephone companies be assigned with a duty to carry broadcast signals ('NAB Questions Possible Telco Entry,' 1988) . No ('Glimmer of Carriage Compromise,' 1988 (Bagdikian, 1987) . In the process of securing the free speech of large corporations, the state and media cartels deploy the fervent language of civil liberties inherited from textbook constructions of the American colonial movement for independence. The result is that the only &dquo;individuals&dquo; granted meaningful rights of self-expression are media corporations. Simultaneously, the idea of mandating direct public access to the dominant commercial media or of imposing requirements on the commercial media to satisfy the public's right to hear opposing views on matters of public importance are invalidated. What we distribution. 139 discover is that government can function to privilege certain voices, whether by design or by default, through various means including decisions not to intervene, and through the introduction of policy voids through the deregulation of entrenched industries (Mosco, 1990) . Deregulation has functioned not simply to &dquo;free&dquo; the marketplace ideas from the shackles of government control. More accurately, it has removed many possibilities for moderating the subjective control of the media by a homogeneous elite.
The historically acknowledged premises of freedom of expression in American liberal theory not only emphasize the individual's right to expression, they also highlight the social goals of free association, of participation, and of furthering understanding. They suggest also that there is always a need to balance individual freedom against larger social goals such as rights of access to the media and a right to hear (Barron, 1973; Emerson, 1970 Emerson, , 1976 , which are treated by some &dquo;strict&dquo; interpreters of underlying colonial intentions in American constitutional law, not really relevant at all to freedom of expression. This can be problematic in our present era when, to the extent that corporations are treated as &dquo;legal persons&dquo; accorded many of the rights traditionally held by individuals -including that of self expression -it is already a reality that the oligopolistic media marketplace of ideas contain little else that can be heard besides the voices of giants talking among themselves. The arguments defending the right of private capital to engage in self-expression in the name of public expression violates some of the generally recognized premises of freedom of expression, particularly the idea that opportunities for participation in public discourse and decision-making should be made possible. What prevails today in the media marketplace is a dangerous equation in which freedom of expression is treated as a property right (e.g., Curran, 1979; Schiller, 1989) . Although this equation is rapidly becoming unassailable, if it has not already reached that status, it must be challenged by a counter-argument which says that democratic and public discourse must be supported through legitimate mechanisms for public control of and access to media institutions. ('Showdown in Kansas City,' 1988 public property, and the operation of these facilities, by any group to which licence has been given, must be part of the system of publicly protected contracts between the cable operators and production companies. In many cases, there could be permanent links, in particular communities, between local public-owned cable companies and production companies: real local bases from which some material would pass into one or another of the networks. At the same time it would be necessary to have some specialised national production companies: alternative providers of national and international news and public affairs programmes; educational and arts companies; a central library and information video-service. The community emphasis is so right, in it own terms, and could so notably contribute to solving the problems of urban informaton flow, democratic discussion and decision-making and community identity, that it is easy to overlook the dimension that is inevitably there, beyond the community -the nation and the world with which it is inevitably involved. The back-up national and international services would protect community television from its greatest danger: that its legitimate sense of locality will leave a gap which will be exploited by wholly irresponsible institutions beyond it. (Williams, 1974, pp. (Aufderheide, 1991 provocative and useful analysis of fundamental social and economic problems in the British mass media, James Curran emphasizes the need to reduce the domination of the media by conglomerates, the need for invigorated media access, and the need for publicly derived subsidies in order to support public expression for purposes other than profit accumulation (Curran, 1984) . The perspective is highly relevant, perhaps more so, to the American commercial media context. In the remainder of this section, Curran's This article has addressed some of the major issues which emerge from the possible transformation of cable television in the United States from a oneto-a-market, vertically integrated model to a common carrier model. Of particular concern are issues related to financing the construction of a broadband common carrier system. Secondly, the issue of whether video common carriers should be permitted to own programming operations must be resolved. Third, in seeking to increase the diversity of access by multiple sources of programming, it is incumbent upon public policy makers that they not overlook the growing concentration of ownership among programming sources and the implications that has for reducing access by small independent sources.
Video common carriage, though hardly a solution by itself to the many distribution.
